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considered when deciding whether there is sufficient state action since this
is a prelude to prohibiting associational rights.66 When the boundary between
state and private action is as unclear as in the instant case, balancing is the
only means of protecting the rights of all parties concerned.6- The fourteenth
amendment only forbids discrimination that is imposed, encouraged, or
fostered by the state. This suggests that governmental interference in the
selection of friends and associates should be very limited. Justice Douglas,
a vigilant foe of discrimination in any form, has acknowledged that each
individual has the right "to pick his own associates so as to express his
preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs
and groups as he chooses." 68
Through unclear reasoning and by ignoring inconvenient facts, the en
banc majority failed to delineate the breadth and scope of the fourteenth
amendment and the state action doctrine in the realm of the private club.
At stake were two groups of interests: those of the members of bona fide
private clubs wishing to discriminate in their private associations and those of
minority groups denied membership as a result of this discrimination. The
instant court failed to articulate the process by which it analyzed these competing interests; thus it provided few guidelines to future courts addressing
similar problems.
WAYNE

J.

BIRSCHBACH

SECURITIES REGULATION: STANDING TO SUE UNDER RULE
lOb-5- FISHING FOR FRAUD WITH AN ORAL CONTRACT
Desserv. Ashton, 408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
Plaintiffs' sought to finance the purchase of Transign, Inc.2 through
defendant Ashton.3 The parties allegedly entered into an oral contract
66. Activities and needs such as education, employment, and housing, essential to
individual realization and minority group mobility, must be distinguished from choosing
close personal relationships in the context of the private club. See Sengstock & Sengstock,
Discrimination:A Constitutional Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 116-25 (1967) (discrimination is acceptable in primary relationships, "characterized by intimate associations,"
but not in secondary ones, characterized by impersonal, formal relations among individuals);
Comment, Association, Privacy, and the Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV.
Civ. Rinsrrs-Crv. LIB. L. REv. 460, 466 (1970) (the more personal the surroundings, the
greater the interest in selecting one's associates); Comment, Constitutional-State ActionPrivate Club's Lease of Bay Bottom Land From City For Token Rental Constitutes State
Action, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 641 (1976) (context of the claim affects the balancing of the
competing interests).
67. See Note, supra note 16, at 863.
68. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298-99 (1966).
1. Plaintiffs are Leonard Desser, Melvin Desser, and Jacob S. Landesman.
first met with defendant Ashton on June 20, 1966.
2. Transign, Inc., a Michigan corporation solely owned by defendant James
was engaged in the luminous sign industry at the time the parties first met
3. Roy Ashton was vice-president of British-American Insurance Co., an
vestment company chartered in the Nassau-Bahamas Islands.
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to form a jointly-owned corporation whose principal assets would consist
of Transign stock and patents. As consideration for divulging confidential
information about Transign,4 plaintiffs were to pay 35 percent of the equity
investment and receive 35 percent of the common stock in the new corporation. 5 Plaintiffs disclosed their information, relying on Ashton's previously
written agreement that he would not deal with or attempt to acquire Transign
except on terms as dictated by the plaintiffs in their sole discretion. 6 Ashton
violated both the oral and written agreements when he and other defendants
acquired Transign.7 Contrary to the agreement on which they relied, plaintiffs
were offered no stock in defendants' corporation. Alleging that they were
induced into entering the oral contract by Ashton's fraudulent misrepresentations of his intent to perform,8 plaintiffs sued for damages, o invoking section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193410 and Rule l0b-51l promulgated

4. Plaintiffs learned the name of the corporation and information about the financial

status of Transign when they met directly with defendant Youngblood to inquire about
purchasing Transign. Youngblood offered to sell the company for $2,000,000.
5. British-American Insurance Co. was to loan $1,600,000 and pay 65% of the remaining
$400,000 to acquire Transign. Plaintiffs were to pay 35% of $400,000. The, common stock
was to be divided in the same proportions, 65% to British-American and 85% to plaintiff.
This purchase price of the stock was well below that to be offered to the general public.
It is disputed whether this was a binding oral agreement.
6. This written agreement was signed on June 20, 1966, before plaintiffs revealed their
confidential information. Plaintiffs alleged that Ashton signed the agreement to induce
them to reveal their information so they would not make any other arrangements for
the purchase of Transign. Defendants counterclaim that plaintiffs falsely represented
they were the sole negotiating representatives for Transign so that Ashton would sign
the agreement, which would preclude British-American from dealing directly with
Transign.
7. Plaintiffs introduced Ashton to James Youngblood in July 1966. On August 31,
1966, British-American, Ashton, and plaintiffs signed an agreement stating that if BritishAmerican completed the acquisition of Transign, plaintiffs would be paid a $100,000 finders
fee. On September 23, 1967, as principal shareholders of Trans-Industries, Inc., defendants
Ashton and Youngblood, with two men not parties to this suit, acquired the common
stock and patents of Transign.
8. Breach of a contract alone is not sufficient to state a claim under Rule lob-5. The
execution of a contract without the intent to perform constitutes fraud within the meaning
of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lob-5. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises,
476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers
Workmen, 397 F.26 727 (7th Cir. 1968).
9. Under the Rule lOb-5 count, plaintiffs claimed as damages the difference between
what they would have paid to acquire 35% of the 1,000,000 shares of Trans-Industries
($43,750) and the value of the same shares at the price offered to the public ($1,837,500).
The $1,793,750 loss discounted by 30% to present market value as a restricted transfer
under the Securities Act of 1933 results in $1,242,500 damages, in addition to punitive
damages of $1,000,000, costs, and attorneys' fees. Pre-trial Order at 9, Desser v. Ashton, 408
F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b) states: "It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange - . . . .
(b) To use or employ, in.connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of suc rules and regnlations as the
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under the authority of the 1934 Act. Denying defendants' motion for summary
judgment,12 the district court HELD,"s without deciding the merits of the
case,1 4 that an oral contract for the purchase and sale of securities need not
satisfy the statute of frauds 5 in order to meet the purchaser-seller requirement 6 for standing to sue under Rule lOb-5. 7
Although Rule lOb-5 does not expressly provide for private remedies,'"
the courts have recognized an implied private cause of action since 1946.1
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."
11. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1975). Rule lOb-5 states: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange, (a) to employ any
device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."
12. The first two complaints were dismissed on other grounds. The third complaint was
drawn in four counts: Count one, for damages under the Rule lob-5 claim; Count two,
for an injunction to stop Ashton's sale of his Trans-Industries stock; Count three, a
pendent state claim for breach of contract; and Count four, a pendent state claim for
tortious interference with a contract.
13. Since the pendent state claims would fall if the Rule lOb-5 cause of action were
dismissed, U.M.W. v. Gibbs, :383U.S. 715 (1966), Judge Pierce adjourned the trial in
progress to hear oral argument on the sufficiency of an oral contract to satisfy standing
to sue under Rule lOb-5. The trial continued on the merits after this ruling was made.
14. Professor Bromberg observes in his treatise on securities law fraud: "As for judicial
decisions, it should be noted that most of them have been on the pleadings. . . . Thus
the typical lob-5 'victory' is only a holding that a cause of action has been stated, good
enough to withstand a motion to dismiss. This is a far cry from victory on the merits,
with adequate proof of the relevant assertions. Finally, most lOb-5 law (and until recent
years practically all of it) is from the District Courts." 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAw:
FRAUD §1.3(2) (1975) (footnote omitted).
15. N.Y. U.C.C. §8-319 (McKinney 1964). The pertinent sections read: "Statute of
Frauds- A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless (a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought
or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for
sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price . . . or (d) the
party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court that a contract was made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a
defined or stated price."
16. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952), the court required that the alleged fraud be committed during a purchase or
sale of securities and that the plaintiffs be purchasers or sellers of those securities.
17. 408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
18. Milton Freedman, SEC attorney stated that: "[The Rule] was intended to give the
Commission power to deal with this problem [fraudulent purchases]. It has no relation to
the Commission's contemplation to private proceedings." Conference on Codification of
the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967); SEC Securities Act Release No.
3230 (May 21, 1942).
19. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Coverage of the
Rule was extended to private sales. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), a/I'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 401 F.2d 833, cert. denied, 394
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In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 20 the Second Circuit limited lOb-5 standing to sue to actual purchasers or sellers of securities in the transaction giving
rise to the charges of fraud and misrepresentation. 21 In the two decades
since Birnbaum, courts have justified the creation of exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule by citing the Supreme Court's mandate to interpret Rule
l0b-5 "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes." 2 2 To keep the anti-fraud provisions paramount, federal courts
have expanded the definitions of "purchase" and "sale"23 to encompass
unconsummated sales 24 and purchases 25 as well as stockholder" and Securities
Exchange Commission 27 suits for injunctive relief. Despite strong criticism

advocating the abolition of the Birnbaum rule as an arbitrary, mechanistic

impediment to securities regulation, 2 courts of appeals have continued to
29
grapple with the Birnbaum limitations.
US. 976 (1968); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). Common law tort
theory provides the basis for the Kardon decision -a private right of action may be
implied from a statute in favor of those whose interests the statute was designed to protect.
RESrATEMENT OF TORTS §286 (1938).
20. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
21. Id. at 464.
22. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
23. Section 3(a)(13) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(13) (1970) provides: "The terms
'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire."
Section 3(a)(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(14) (1970) provides: "The terms 'sale'
and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
When the bill that became the Securities Exchange Act was presented to the Senate,
Section 3(11) defined "buy" and "purchase" to "include any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire, attempt or offer to acquire or solicitation of an offer to sell any security

or any interest in a security." (emphasis added). Section 3(12) defined "sale" or "sell"
to "include any contract of sale or disposition of, contract to sell or dispose of, attempt or
offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or any interest therein."

(emphasis added). This broad language was deleted from the bill prior to passage. See S.
2963, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 2265 (1934).
24. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., Inc., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967) (forced seller); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (aborted seller);
Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966)
(frustrated seller).
25. Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (aborted
purchase).
26. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540 (1967) (plaintiff stockholder seeking
injunction for corporate mismanagement).
27. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (SEC not subject to purchaserseller rule when seeking injunction against merger of insurance companies based on charges
of fraudulent misrepresentation to stockholders).
28. See, e.g., Boone & McGowen, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule lob-5, 49 TEx. L.
REv. 617 (1971); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
10b-5, 54 VA. L. RaV. 268 (1968); Comment, Dumping Birnbaum To Force Analysis of
the Standing Requirement Under Rule 10b-5, 6 LoYoLA L.J. 230 (1975).
29. For decisions endorsing the Birnbaum rule, see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Landry v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1974); Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972); Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d
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In 1975 the Supreme Court confronted the issue of Rule lOb-5 standing
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. ° Unexpectedly reversing the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,3' the Court resoundingly endorsed the
Birnbaum rule32 in three particulars. First, the Court noted that standing to
sue under Rule lOb-5 is limited by the definitions of "purchase" and "sale"
as contained within the Securities Exchange Act.33 Second, the lower courts'
continued recognition of the Birnbaum rule3 4 and the failure of two attempts
by Congress to broaden the language of Rule l0b-535 indicate a limit to its
remedial scope. Finally, the Birnbaum rule reflects judicial concern for the
securities market, which is particularly vulnerable to vexatious litigation36
based on parol allegations uncorroborated by the objective record of an
actual purchase or sale.'7

Justice Blackmun's dissent in Blue Chip, emphasizing the seeming incompatibility of a liberal interpretation of Rule 1Ob-538 and the Birnbaum
barrier, proposed a logical nexus test that would require a showing of a causal
relationship between the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale in question. 39
455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422
F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131 (10th
Cir. 1967). Compare Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) with Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960). For decisions abandoning the Birnbaum
rule, see notes 24-25 supra. See also Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d
654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
30. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
31. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973).
32. 421 U.S. at 752. The Court in Blue Chip held that a plaintiff not a party to a consent
decree has no contractual right for the purchase of securities on which to assert standing
to sue under Rule lOb-5. That plaintiff merely refrained from purchasing due to fraudulent
misrepresentations is not sufficient. Id. at 754-55. Accord, Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. 421 U.S. at 732. See note 23 supra.
34. 421 U.S. at 732. See note 29 supra.
35. Id. The Court noted that in both 1957 and 1959, Congress rejected the proposals
of the SEC to extend the coverage of §10(b) by amending the wording from "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" to "in connection with the purchase or sale of,
or any attempt to purchase or sell, any security." (emphasis added) (citing 103 CONG. REc.
11,636 (1957)); SEC Legislation, Hearings Before Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency on S. 1178-1182, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 367-68 (1959); S. 2545, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957); S. 1179, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
36. Id. at 740. The Court stated that Congress has recognized the potential for "strike"
suits when "a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect
of success at trial .
Id.
37. Id. at 742.
38. Id. at 764-65. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented.
"To my mind, the word 'sale' ordinarily and naturally may be understood to mean not
only a single, individualized act transferring property from one party to another, but also
the generalized event of public disposal of property through advertisement, auction, or
some other market mechanism." Id.
39. Id. at 770. Accord, Easn v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
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The nexus test would demand formulation of evidentiary standards on a
case by case basis, 40 the very piecemeal approach that the majority in Blue
Chip sought to avoid-l by giving its imprimatur to the Birnbaum rule.
Until the instant case, Rule lOb-5 cases have focused on the nature of the
transaction42 to determine whether it qualified as a purchase or sale under
Birnbaum. The instant case explored the novel issue of the form of the transaction- an oral contract for the purchase of securities. It is clear that the
Securities Exchange Act definitions of "purchase" and "sale" include contracts for purchase or sale.43 However, the Act does not address the admissibility
of oral contracts, and no prior case has resolved the issue." The Blue Chip
decision requires that the plaintiff be a party to an enforceable contract.45
If an oral contract for purchase is deemed binding and admissible for purposes
of the Act, the plaintiffs in the instant case, unlike the plaintiffs in Blue
Chip," would have an enforceable obligation sufficient to meet the Birnbaum
requirements for standing to sue under Rule 101>5. If the oral contract was
not to be performed due to the exercise of fraud and misrepresentation, the
plaintiffs would still be regarded as purchasers or sellers on the basis of the
contractual obligation. Conversely, if the oral contract is found unenforceable,
the plaintiffs are denied standing under Rule lOb-5; moreover, there is no
state created remedy for breach of contract since suit on an oral contract is
4
barred by the statute of frauds. 7
In the instant case the district court noted that only two previous cases
had alluded to the possible admission of an oral contract to satisfy-Rule
lOb-5 standing.48 In Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co." 9 a suit for fraud in
connection with a contract for sale of stock, the court assumed without discussion that an oral contract, if proved, would be admissible to assert stand-

40. See Brief for the Securities Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 24-25, Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store% 421 U.S. 723, 743 (1975).
41. 421 US. at 755.
42. See notes 24,25 supra.
43. See note 23 supra.
44. 408 F. Supp. at 1175. However, as the instant case noted, Professor Louis Loss
in his treatise on securities law, examined the following hypothetical: "If X resorts to a
fraudulent device to escape a contractual obligation to buy Y's securities, the device would

seem no less lawful under Rule lOb-5 because the contract later turned out to be unenforceable on account of some illegality on the part of Y. Just as not every breach of
contract violates the rule, it is equally true that there can be a violation of the
rule... without an enforceable contract." Id. at 1175 (quoting 3 L. Loss, SEcUarrms REGULATION 1475, n.102 (2d ed. 1961)).
45. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750 (1975). Accord, Duplan
Corp. v. Iroquois Indus., CCH. FED. SEc. L. REP. %92,318 (W.D.N.Y. 1968)
Transfer Binder).

(1967-1969

46. Plaintiffs in Blue Chip were not parties to the antitrust consent decree that
established the offer of Blue Chip stock. With neither a contractual right or duty to
purchase securities nor an actual purchase, they stood in the same position as any other
disappointed offeree of a stock offering. 421 US. at 750.
47. See note 15 supra.
48. 408 F. Supp. at 1176.
49. 307 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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0 The court in Dopp v. Franklin National Bank ' reasoned that when
plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from selling
certain stock, factual disputes as to the existence of an oral contract should
not be resolved on affidavits and depositions; rather, "an evidentiary hearing
was essential." 52 The court in Dopp confined its remarks concerning the
admission of an oral contract to dictum, observing that it was "difficult to
believe" that plaintiff would allege as the basis for his Rule lOb-5 claim a
contract not reduced to writing as required by Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) section 8-319.53
With this brief reference to the statute of frauds, 54 the instant court approved the use of oral contracts because of the absence of any express
section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 prohibition and because of the "broad, anti-fraud
purposes of the section." 55 In response to Blue Chip's admonitions about the
dangers of parol evidence, the court illogically resolved to use more oral
testimony to clarify the contractual relationship. 56 The court did not hold
simply that an oral contract may be admitted into evidence when accompanied
by other proof that would remove all doubt as to the terms and intent of
the parties. 57 Instead, it went further to conclude that an oral contract
barred by the statute of frauds and devoid of any legal or equitable redemption58 may be used to assert standing under Rule l0b-5."9

50. Id. at 719. The court did not touch on the distinction, if any, that would be
made between oral and written contracts submitted as evidence of a contract for sale
under Rule lOb-5.
51. 461 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 879.
53. Id. at 880. See note 15 supra. The text of N.Y. U.C.C. §8-319 (McKinney 1964)
corresponds to the text of U.C.C. §8-319.
54. 408 F. Supp. at 1176.
55. Id. at 1177.
56. "[T]he abolition of the Birnbaum rule would throw open to the trier of fact
many rather hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which depended almost entirely
on oral testimony. We in no way disparage the worth and frequent high value of oral
testimony when we say that dangers of its abuse appear to exist in this type of action to
a peculiarly high degree." Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 412 U.S. 723, 743
(1975).
57. 408 F. Supp. at 1175.
58. It is beyond the scope of this comment to examine the theories underlying the
exceptions that may remove an oral contract from the statute of frauds: equitable estoppel,
partial performance, and perpetration of fraud by use of the statute of frauds. However,
the most recently reported case involving U.C.C. §8-319, Butcher v. U.S. Inv. Corp., 236
Pa. Super. 8, 344 A.2d 583 (1975), dismissed a suit for quantum meruit recovery for
services rendered and for breach of defendant's inducement to enter into the oral
contract when the inducement was the oral contract itself. Id. at 586-87.
An oral contract, unenforceable under the statute of frauds, may be alleged and proved
in collateral suits against third parties, e.g., for tortious interference with the contract
because it creates the same rights, powers, privileges, and immunities as would an
enforceable contract. RESTATEMtENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAMCS §218, comment (d) (Tent.
Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACrS §289 (1950).
Traditionally, neither oral contracts for employment, see, e.g., Baldassare v. Rare Metals
Derivatives, Inc., 282 A.2d 262 (1971), nor contracts for finders fees, see, e.g., Hiller v.
Franklin Mint, Inc., 485 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973), are barred by U.C.C. §8-319.
59. 408 F. Supp. at 1176. But cf., REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTcrs §217-E (Tent.
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The instant plaintiffs asserted federal question jurisdiction ° by invoking
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,61 arguing that this federal
assumption of broad protective regulation would preempt conflicting state
legislation.62 However, in this case the issue is the interpretation of a specific
term within a regulatory act.63 Since the Act does not set forth the elements
requisite to a valid contract, the court faced a difficult choice of law problem:
whether to incorporate a state statutory standard, U.C.C. section 8-319, or
engage 65in the creative formulation of a federal common law- "statute" of
frauds.
When jurisdiction is premised on the basis of a federal claim,"6 the court
ordinarily exercises unfettered discretion 67 in defining the parameters of the
right to sue. An unchallenged line of cases holds that federal courts may
fashion rules and remedies that will best achieve the intent underlying a
federally created right.68 In the instant case, no federal standards exist to
Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973): "The statute of frauds does not make an unenforceable contract inadmissible in evidence for any purpose other than its enforcement in violation of the
statute." This section is not contrary to the Birnbaum rule since that case specifically
requires an enforceable contract to assert standing.
60. 28 U.S.C. §1331(a) (1971): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." There was no general grant of federal question jurisdiction until 1875.
Judiciary Act of 1875 §1, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1971)).
61. See notes 10, 11 supra.
62. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, reh. denied,
373 U.S. 947 (1963) (federal common law will apply to determine contract rights under
§204 of the Railway Labor Act); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(contract disputes under the Labor-Management Relations Act would be adjudicated under
federal not state law). See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 US. (12 How.) 299 (1851);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (regulation of interstate commerce).
63. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (whether an illegitimate
was a child entitled to renewal interests under the Copyright Act was determined by
state probate definition).
64. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rav. 797, 800 (1957); Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLux. L. Rxv. 489, 530 (1954); Note,
The Federal Common Law, 82 I-Aiv. L. REv. 1512 (1969); Comment, Rules of Decision in
Nondiversity Suits, 69 YAL L J. 1428 (1960).
65. Corbin refers to the statute of frauds as "common statutory law" because each
state enacts each of several statutes of fraud. 2 A. CORnIN, CoNRaCrs §278 (1950). See,
e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBuG. LAw §5-701 (McKinney 1973) (general requirements for execution,
acknowledgment, or enforceability of agreements); N.Y. U.C.C. §2-201 (McKinney 1964)
(statute 6f frauds governing contracts for sale of goods).
66. See note 12 supra. A true conflicts of law situation would have arisen had federal
jurisdiction been predicated on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1971). Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U:5..64 (1938), and progeny (Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945)) would have required a functional analysis of the effect of applying the
state statute of frauds.
67. See Mishkin, supra note 64 at 802-03; Comment, supra note 64, at 1449.
68. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (federal common law, not state law, will
control when there is an overriding federal interest in the protection of air and interstate
waterways); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 33g U.S. 301 (1.947) (administrative
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resolve the issue of the enforceability of oral contracts. The Securities Exchange
Act does not define "contract" to include or exclude an oral contract of sale.
To determine the degree of importance to be given to the state statute of
frauds provision, three considerations must be weighed: first, a court should
ascertain whether the scope of the federal interest is so great as to preclude
consideration of state law. Since the Securities Exchange Act does not provide
a federal statute of frauds to govern the enforceability of oral contracts for
sale of securities,69 the judiciary must assume the task of filling in this "legislative lacuna. ' ' 7 0 Statutory silence7' gives rise to the presumption that state law

should be the source of these rules unless federal policy has clearly preempted
consideration of state law.7 2 Evidence that securities fraud has not become
the exclusive concern of the federal government is found in the concurrent
operation of the Securities Exchange Act and state blue sky laws, 73 even

though access to state courts has traditionally been more limited than has
74
access to federal courts under Rule lOb-5.
Rule 10b-5 attempts to prevent fraud, not to define enforceable contracts.
In fashioning the scope of the right to sue under Rule lOb-5, federal courts
are free to draw on the experience of the states in defining enforceable contracts. Disallowing the use of oral contracts to assert standing, in accord with

practicality demands a uniform rule); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173
(1942) (Erie doctrine is inapplicable in areas so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes).
See also 0.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Court implied a cause of action
and relief for violation of §27 of the Securities Exchange Act, prohibiting use of false information in the solicitation oF proxies. This decision parallels that made in Kardon v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Court did not attempt to formulate
a definition of the terms of §27.
In speaking of a private course of action for damages under Rule lOb-5, the Court
acknowledged that the judiciary may not circumscribe a right that Congress has conferred
because of any disagreement with the creation of expansive liability. The Court noted,
however, that since Congress (lid not expressly create a private cause of action under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the judiciary would develop the "contours" of the private
cause of action until Congress spoke. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 748-49 (1975).
69. But see note 23 supra (legislative history appears to indicate that Congress rejected
a broad interpretation of "purchase" and "sale"). See also note 35 supra. Rules of Decision
Act. 28 U.S.C. §1652 (1970).
70. Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 1084, 1090 (1964).
71. See generally Bickle, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARv. L. Rav. 200 (1972).
72. Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1955). See Note, supra note 64, at 1436-37;
Hart, supra note 64, at 497. Accord, United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
Contra, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme, & Co.
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
73. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §352-c (McKinney 1968).
74. State procedural obstacles to prosecution of a securities fraud claim include security
for expense statutes (a bond posted to cover anticipated costs), limited jurisdiction and
venue, and stricter financial discovery requirements. In federal court, in addition to the
liberal discovery permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no
minimum jurisdictional amount or diversity of citizenship requirement.
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Blue Chip's distrust of parol evidence, 5 would not eviscerate Rule lOb-5.76
Second, the incorporating of state law into the federal remedy as an
alternative to creation of entirely different federal common law must be considered. In the field of commercial law the U.C.C. recognizes the customarily
"oral" conduct of securities transactions- and prescribes minimal written
formalities necessary to create a legally binding record of intent to contract.78
If a contract for purchase or sale of securities does not satisfy U.C.C. section
8-319, it is unenforceable as between the contracting parties." Although the
near universal adoption of the Code 0 cannot insure uniformity of interpretation, section 8-319 does provide a standard against which parties may measure
their expectations as to the enforceability of a securities contract. In refusing to apply U.C.C. section 8-319, the instant court seemingly rejects the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which in another
case noted that:
We find persuasive defendant's suggestion of looking to the Uniform
Commercial Code as a source for the "federal" law of sales. . . . [It]
is thus well on its way to becoming a truly national law of commerce,
which as Judge L. Hand said of the Negotiable Instruments Law, is
"more complete and more certain than any other which can conceivably be drawn from those sources of 'general' law to which we
were accustomed to resort in the days of Swift v. Tyson."81
The instant court acted within the limits of its discretion in judicially
legislating8 2 the admissibility of oral contracts, but in so doing it injected
that degree of disparity between state and federal application of law so
strongly disapproved in diversity cases.8 3 Under this court's rule, an oral
contract unenforceable under the state statute of frauds84 would be admissible
75. See note 56 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
77.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §8-319, Comment.

78. N.Y. U.C.C. §8-319 (McKinney 1964).
79. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-201, Comment 4.
80. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and all states except Louisiana have adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code.
81. United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966) (footnote
omitted). Accord, Everett Plywood & Door Corp. v. United States, 419 F.2d 425, 429-30
(Ct. Cl. 1969) (relying on the U.C.C. §2-107 definition of a contract for sale of goods to
determine which statute of frauds to apply - the statute applicable to the recording of land
or sale of goods); United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1971) (the Code and
its general body of precedent provide the most logical source material supplying the
content of federal common law).
The Hext court's discussion of choice of law stresses uniformity of the law as well
as uniform application since the United States was a party to the suit, as it was in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). However, the court also notes the
application of the Code to suits between private parties arising under the federal laws
of bankruptcy and admiralty. 444 F.2d at 810 n.17.
82. See Mishkin, supra note 64, at 800.
83. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
84. See Wolfson v. Moye, 214 So. 2d 629 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (oral acceptance
of a contract of sale of stock was insufficient to remove the contract from the statute of
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in federal court when coupled with an allegation of fraud in its execution
or performance.
Third, an inquiry should be made into the expectations of the parties to
the alleged contract as to the applicability of state or federal law. Private
parties negotiating a contract for sale of securities have only the provisions
of U.C.C. section 8-319 to look to as a standard.8 5 It would be more reasonable
to incorporate the provisions of state law to govern all determinations as
to validity of the contract for the purposes of a lOb-5 suit. If the rule in
the instant case is followed, any alleged oral contract would be sufficient to
assert standing under Rule lOb-5; thus, this merges the discrete concepts of
standing8 6 and adjudication on the merits, so that the sufficiency of the terms
of an oral contract to create an enforceable obligation will not be tested
until trial1 7 If, instead, U.C.C. section 8-319 was followed, there would be
uniform and predictable determinations on the standing issue in Rule 1Ob-5
suits.
The statute of frauds must not be used to perpetrate fraud by unduly
protecting defendants from prosecution for their wrongful acts. On the other
hand, plaintiffs must be held to meet a minimal threshold standard of proof
of a contract in order to invoke Rule IOb-5. When the Supreme Court approved
the Birnbaum purchaser-seller standing limitation, it chose to protect the
sensitive securities market from the abuse of nuisance litigation at the risk
of denying a federal forum to plaintiffs with legitimate claims of securities
fraud under Rule lOb-5. The instant decision rejecting the minimal provisions of U.C.C. section 8-319 upsets established expectations as to the validity
and enforceability of oral contracts and converts the role of a federal court
in the field of securities regulation to that of an angler for truth in a sea of
conflicting testimony.
SALLY

FOOTE CotcoRAN

frauds); Scarpinato v. Nat'l Patent Dev. Corp., 75 Misc. 2d 94, 347 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1973) (an
option to purchase stock included in an oral compensation agreement for consulting
services was not enforceable); Mortimer S. Burnside & Co. v. Havener Sec. Corp., 25

App. Div. 2d 373, 269 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1966)

(oral agreement for assignment of common

stock purchase warrants was unenforceable as a contract for "sale" of a security); Butcher
v. U.S. Inv. Corp., 236 Pa. Super. 8, 344 A.2d 583 (1975).

85. See note 15 supra.
86. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975), the Court held that plaintiffs
must make out standing on a "case or controversy" within the meaning of article III before
a federal court may try the merits. Each plaintiff must have a personal stake in a
specific injury. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Warth retreats from the

more liberal "zone of interest" test enunciated in Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-56 (1970), which asks whether there is an
injury in fact and whether the complainant's interest arguably falls within the zone of
interests to be protected by the statute in question. Accord, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159

(1970).
87. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve as a screening device at the pleadings
stage to clarify the issues and to test the sufficiency of the evidence. If oral contracts are
prima facie sufficient to assert standing, then Rule 12 is satisfied. Similarly, neither FED. R.
Cirv. P. 12(c), permitting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, nor FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e),
allowing a motion for more definite statement, is fully available to the defendant because
the disputed existence and terms of the contract are resolved only at trial.
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